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A B S T R A C T
Through a systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature, this paper analyzes evidence of the livelihood
impacts of Payments for Environmental Services (PES). Forty-six studies assessed PES livelihood impacts. The
assessments presented more positive livelihood impacts than negative ones, focusing on ﬁnancial beneﬁts. Non-
monetary and non-material impacts of PES were largely understudied. Most reviews focused on ES providers,
hindering the understanding of broader societal impacts. The review yielded examples where participants lost
from their participation or where improvements in one livelihood dimension paralleled deterioration in another.
Consequently, we identiﬁed key research gaps in: i) understanding the social and cultural impacts of PES, ii)
evaluating environmental and economic additionality from improving other ES at the expense of cultural ones,
iii) and assessing PES impacts in terms of trade-oﬀs between multiple livelihood dimensions. Moreover, in-
creased knowledge is needed on the impact of PES on changes in household expenditure and choice, and on
trade-oﬀs between household income and inequality in ES provider communities. Finally, if PES schemes are
implemented to sustainably improve livelihoods, targeting disaggregated populations, understanding equity and
social power relations within and between ES providers and users, and better monitoring and evaluation systems
that consider locally relevant livelihood dimensions are needed.
1. Introduction
The ﬁrst experiences with Payments for Environmental Services
(PES) date back to the 1990s. PES are agreements between providers
and users of environmental services1 (ES) in which users who beneﬁt
from ES compensate providers who maintain them oﬀ-site. In the
agreement, ES providers must take action to maintain and improve ES
provision, or reverse their degradation, to achieve conservation goals
(Wunder, 2015). PES rely on the idea that positive environmental ex-
ternalities can be internalized by creating appropriate markets and
market instruments such as conditional rewards (Pearce and Turner,
1990). Wunder (2015) redeﬁned PES as voluntary transactions (not
necessarily market-based) between service users and providers (not
limited to markets or individuals) to generate oﬀ-site services (beneﬁts
received oﬀ-site that cannot be otherwise charged). These transactions
are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management. Other
mainstreamed deﬁnitions rely on the incremental provision of en-
vironmental services (Sommerville et al., 2009; Tacconi, 2012) or on
incentives to align individual/collective land-use decisions and social
interest by transferring resources between social actors (Muradian
et al., 2010). In practice, most PES schemes do not follow the original
Coasean concept where externalities are best dealt with through private
negotiations (Martin-Ortega et al., 2012; Schomers and Matzdorf,
2013). Some deﬁnitions reﬂect how PES were designed in practice. For
example, reward-based conceptualizations include pro-poor or fairness
objectives as part of the PES deﬁnition criteria (Bulte et al., 2008;
Iftikhar et al., 2007; Van Noordwijk et al., 2007). This implies a synergy
between socioeconomic and environmental impacts, usually assumed
by nongovernmental organizations, donors, and international co-
operation agencies when providing support to PES (Wunder, 2008).
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However, this assumption has seldom been assessed (Pagiola et al.,
2005; Pattanayak et al., 2010) nor, more in general, has the link be-
tween well-being and environmental indicators (Cruz-Garcia et al.,
2017).
The eﬀectiveness of PES in achieving multiple objectives simulta-
neously is debatable (Muradian et al., 2013; Wunder, 2013).
Few studies have explored or proved the synergies between PES and
livelihood outcomes (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Pagiola et al.,
2005; Wunder, 2008; Tallis et al., 2008). Certainly, assessing the so-
cioeconomic impacts of PES is complex and requires evaluation across a
range of actors – ES providers, direct users, and beyond (Grieg-Gran
et al., 2005; Hegde and Bull, 2011) – and time scales. Systematic
monitoring and evaluation of PES, including their long-term environ-
mental and livelihood eﬀects, lag behind (Ezzine-De-Blas et al., 2016;
Hejnowicz et al., 2014).
Therefore, understanding to what extent and under what conditions
PES schemes have successfully improved livelihoods is urgently needed
to guide future PES implementation with synergistic environmental and
livelihood goals.
In this paper, we examine published evidence of the livelihood
impacts of PES, based on a systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey
literature available online. As diﬀerent authors refer to impacts on
poverty, well-being, equity, and so on, we use the term livelihoods as an
umbrella deﬁnition. Using the sustainable livelihoods approach, we
deﬁne livelihoods as capabilities and means of living embedded within
a paradigm of equity and sustainability (Chambers and Conway, 1992).
We analyze PES impacts in relation to diﬀerent dimensions that con-
tribute to sustainable livelihoods, including but not limited to ﬁnancial,
social, human, physical, and natural capital. Our review aims to answer
two research questions: (1) what is the evidence of livelihood impacts
of PES schemes evaluated in the literature? and (2) what are the current
gaps in the generation of evidence of livelihood impacts of PES
schemes?
2. Contextual Background
According to the literature, the positive eﬀects of PES include in-
creased land tenure security (Lawlor et al., 2013), ﬁnancial gains, in-
come stability, and diversiﬁcation (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008).
Additionally, PES can generate health beneﬁts through improving and
stabilizing sources of drinking water (Wunder, 2008). PES can provide
recreation beneﬁts, cultural opportunities, strengthened social net-
works and institutions, and economic growth (Iftikhar et al., 2007;
Tacconi et al., 2013).
PES can also generate negative livelihood impacts. Constraints to
resource-extractive activities may lead to lower local production, price
increases, and market dependency (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder,
2008). Social tensions can arise from unequal beneﬁt appropriation
(Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008). PES-induced land-use re-
strictions can aﬀect cultural traditions (Trac et al., 2013; Yang et al.,
2013). Disbursement of payments only in the ﬁrst years of PES scheme
operation can aﬀect income stability in the long term (Mahanty et al.,
2013; Tacconi et al., 2013).
Previous reviews that analyzed livelihood impacts, among other
aspects of PES, are available. In their review of REDD+ schemes,
Lawlor et al. (2013) ﬁnd that, despite the lack of robust evidence, these
incentives improved land tenure security and decision-making power
but provided moderate income gains. According to Leimona et al.
(2009), low population density in ES provider areas and low opportu-
nity and transaction costs determine signiﬁcant eﬀects on rural income.
Tacconi et al. (2013) illustrate that several PES schemes strengthened
local institutions and community engagement with local government,
and expanded farmers' networks. Samii et al. (2014) reported trade-oﬀs
between conservation and poverty reduction goals, but identiﬁed only
two rigorous studies on livelihood impacts of PES. Hejnowicz et al.
(2014) analyzed the conditions under which PES achieved multiple
objectives. Börner et al. (2017) highlighted an important gap in the
analysis of trade-oﬀs between PES ecological performance and social
outcomes.
Calvet-Mir et al. (2015) highlighted the need to generate more
evidence through systematic reviews to foster comparable analyses on
PES scheme design and implementation. We address this by a sys-
tematic analysis of the published evidence of livelihood impacts of PES.
While previous reviews focused on deﬁned geographic or economic
areas, outcomes, types of PES, or PES features, we provide a global
search of PES evaluations that report any livelihood impact. We go
beyond previous reviews by focusing only on livelihood impacts and
comparing positive and negative impacts on disaggregated actors. We
do not use a speciﬁc deﬁnition of PES and include all PES schemes
deﬁned as such in the publications found. Our analysis addresses the
gap between PES theory and practice to contribute to ongoing debates
on the role of PES in livelihood improvement, and the challenges of
designing PES for this purpose.
3. Methodology
We systematically reviewed peer-reviewed publications and grey
literature, following the PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). A
comprehensive search for peer-reviewed studies on the livelihood im-
pacts of PES was performed using the online SciVerse Scopus (title,
abstract, and keywords search) and Thomson Reuter's Web of Science
search engine (title search, topic search). We did not specify document
type, language, year of publication, or study region. The search terms
used were “payments or rewards”, AND “environmental or ecosystem
services”, AND “impact*”, AND “evaluation or assessment”.
According to the Greynet.org deﬁnition, we included the following
types of grey literature: institutional reports, working papers, con-
sultant reports, non-peer-reviewed book chapters, and conference pro-
ceedings. We consulted the following databases: Agricola, 3ie, Abdul
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, Grey Literature Report, OpenGrey,
OAIster, and Google. Given the diﬀerent archiving systems of these
databases, the search terms used were “payments or rewards for en-
vironmental or ecosystem services” AND “impact”.
We ﬁrst searched all databases in April 2016 and then reran the
whole search in January 2018 to update the analysis (Appendix A).
After removing duplicates and reading through all 1268 titles, we
screened 885 records, of which we identiﬁed 74 eligible for full-text
assessment. We excluded studies that reported only on the environ-
mental impacts of PES or focused on the design, planning, frameworks,
and concepts related to PES or other topics. We also excluded review
papers in favor of studies that provided an in-depth analysis and eva-
luation of the livelihood impacts of speciﬁc PES schemes. The ﬁnal
sample of documents eligible for full-text review had 46 publications.
We analyzed them in terms of who gained and who lost from PES im-
plementation and whether they participated (as ES providers, users, or
buyers) or not in the PES. We highlighted methods to evaluate impacts
and sources of data collection.
Fig. 1 shows the methodological approach, while Appendix A details
the databases consulted, the search terms used per database, and the
ﬁnal number of records included after removing duplicates.
4. Results
We brieﬂy overview here the general trends of the studies reviewed.
Appendix B details the 46 publications, while Appendix C provides a
synthetic table with the main characteristics of the PES schemes they
evaluated. Appendix D provides more detail about geographical dis-
tribution of the studies, key features of the PES evaluated, and the
methods used by the studies to evaluate them. Finally, Appendix E
shows the positive and negative impacts of PES in the studies reviewed,
the method they used to analyze them, who gains and who loses from
positive and negative impacts.
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Forty-six publications (or 5% of the publications screened) eval-
uated livelihood impacts. Seventy-eight percent of the publications
were peer-reviewed articles; 20 publications (43%) evaluated PES
schemes in Latin America, while 18 studies assessed PES in Asia (Fig. 2)
and 8 in Africa.
The 46 studies evaluated 24 PES or PES-like schemes. In 17 PES
schemes, the incentive mechanisms were cash transfers, followed by a
combination of in-kind and cash transfer (6), and one scheme providing
only in-kind compensation. ES buyers were mainly governments (62%),
and ES providers were individual households (15 PES), entire com-
munities (7), or both (2).
The studies applied mostly qualitative (43%) and quantitative
methods (30%), half with counterfactuals (participants vs non-partici-
pants) (Fig. 3A and C). The most common data collection methods were
surveys (63%) interviews (39%), and document reviews (36%)
(Fig. 3B). Livelihood impacts were often analyzed through tests of
diﬀerences (30%) and descriptive statistics (26%) (Fig. 3D).
Fig. 4 shows the number of studies that assessed each indicator and
the number of impacts found for each. Seventy-eight percent of the
studies, both counterfactual and non-counterfactual, focused on ﬁ-
nancial impacts of PES, followed by employment, agricultural produc-
tion, and physical capital. Few publications analyzed non-monetary and
non-material indicators, including social, human, and natural capital.
Only 4 studies (all non-counterfactuals) assessed PES impacts in terms
of cultural capital.
4.1. Livelihood Impacts
Our review found more nuanced and varied livelihood impacts than
those presented in Section 2 (Appendix D). All studies except two
(Martin et al., 2014; Arriagada et al., 2018) found changes in liveli-
hoods due to program participation. Non-counterfactual studies high-
lighted more negative impacts (39 impacts: 12 qualitative studies, 3
mixed methods studies) than counterfactual assessments (16 impacts: 5
quantitative studies, 1 qualitative study, 5 mixed methods studies). In
total, 33 studies analyzed more than one livelihood dimension. Out of
these, 10 reported only positive impacts, while 23 (9 counterfactual)
reported positive impacts in certain dimensions and negative impacts in
others. For instance, while PES participants derived beneﬁts in social
capital and employment, some lost beneﬁts in another, such as income
(Locatelli et al., 2008). Conversely, participants of a PES scheme in
Cambodia derived beneﬁts in multiple livelihood dimensions such as
income, agricultural production, and food security simultaneously
(Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015).
4.1.1. Financial Capital and Flows
Thirty-six studies analyzed the ﬁnancial impacts of PES, with mixed
conclusions. Out of these, four did not ﬁnd any change in ﬁnancial
capital or ﬂows.
Out of the 32 studies that found any change in the ﬁnancial di-
mension, 27 reported on variations in household income or on the share
of income deriving from the PES payments. Twenty studies only found
income increases due to PES implementation, while ﬁve only reported
income losses. Those who gained were usually households that pro-
vided ES. Similarly, those who lost were individual providers (7) or
provider communities (3). Importantly, four evaluations reported both
income gains and losses, but for diﬀerent types of households.
Given the predominance of assessments reporting income changes,
we illustrate the heterogeneity of indicators used, methods, and ﬁnd-
ings in Appendix F. Ten papers reported the share of income from PES,
Fig. 1. Methodological approach.
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while 12 quantify the income change due to PES. PES-induced income
changes varied considerably, with income increases ranging from 14%
(Miranda et al., 2003) to as much as 400% (Yang et al., 2013) and
potential decreases of about 60% (Leimona et al., 2010). Overall, few
studies quantiﬁed income changes. For instance, only four counter-
factuals (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Liang et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2013;
Jack and Cardona-Santos, 2017) quantiﬁed PES eﬀects on comparable
income indicators (household income). All except one found signiﬁcant
positive eﬀects.
As for speciﬁc PES schemes, three counterfactual studies (Li et al.,
2011; Liang et al., 2012; Yin et al., 2014) attributed income increases of
diﬀerent intensity to the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) in
China. Four non-counterfactual studies (Liu et al., 2008; Trac et al.,
2013; He and Sikor, 2015; Qu et al., 2017) also reported income in-
creases. Trac et al. (2013) reported negative impacts of the SLCP on
income due to a lack of markets for promoted cash crops, while Liang
et al. (2012) found income decreases for households with children but
without elderly.
In the Paddy Land-to-Dry Land (PLDL) program in China, increased
earnings from other sources balanced the decrease in agricultural in-
come for participants compared with non-participants (Zheng et al.,
2013).
Three non-counterfactual studies on the Natural Forest
Conservation Program (NFCP) in China presented multifaceted eﬀects.
ES providers' income increased, but whether these eﬀects were attri-
butable to the NFCP was unclear (Yang et al., 2013). Conversely, the
NFCP did not compensate for the loss of income induced by logging and
grazing bans (Cao, 2011). Moreover, while ES providers gained from
additional income sources, forestry workers in provider communities,
who depended on timber harvesting, suﬀered large economic losses
(Liu et al., 2008).
In Costa Rica, two counterfactual studies reported income increases
for ES providers (Cole, 2010; Miranda et al., 2003). Two non-counter-
factual studies2 (Locatelli et al., 2008; Porras et al., 2013) found that
activities linked to reforestation helped diversify the income of parti-
cipants. However, smallholders and the working class suﬀered negative
short-term ﬁnancial impacts compared with richer landowners
(Locatelli et al., 2008).
Concerning the Programme for Hydrological Environmental
Services (PSAH) in Mexico, one counterfactual study reported improved
access to credit (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014) while a second found no im-
provement in the ﬁnancial well-being of participants (Scullion et al.,
Fig. 2. Geographical distribution of publications evaluating livelihood impacts of PES schemes (n=46)*.
* The circle size reﬂects the number of publications per country, also indicated by the numbers. The segments within the circles show the number of PES schemes evaluated by the
publications.
2 Locatelli et al. (2008) reconstructed baseline information by recall by asking land-
owners if and how their situation changed with the PES scheme compared to before its
implementation.
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Fig. 3. Methods applied in PES livelihood evaluations (n=46).






Financial capital and ﬂows (36)
Economic or monetary 
Without counterfactual With counterfactual




Natural capital and ﬂows (9)
Human capital (11)
Social capital (15)
Non monetary or non material
Without counterfactual With counterfactual
Fig. 4. Livelihood dimensions found in the PES evaluations (n= 46).
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2011). Non-counterfactual studies reported mixed results. Corbera
(2010) found moderate income increases for individual PSAH provi-
ders. Income inequality decreased between ES providers, although
widening the poverty gap with non-providers in the same communities
(García-Amado et al., 2011).
For the Socio Bosque scheme in Ecuador, a counterfactual study
(Raes et al., 2014) reported income increases for individual providers,
while two non-counterfactual studies reported increases especially for
small landowners (Bremer et al., 2014) and income diversiﬁcation at
the community level (Farley et al., 2011). A non-counterfactual as-
sessment of the Pimampiro PES in Ecuador found that powerful
households gained the most, which reinforced unequal resource allo-
cation (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013).
The Olare Orok Conservancy PES in Kenya prevented a larger share
of participants from slipping below the poverty line compared with
non-participants, but their income sources decreased due to crowding
of pastoral land (Osano et al., 2013). Additionally, payments reduced
income inequality among participants, but broadened the income gap
with non-participants.
Two counterfactual studies on the Nhambita Community Carbon
Project in Mozambique reported income increases for ES providers
(Hegde and Bull, 2011; Jindal, 2010).
A counterfactual study (Kwayu et al., 2017) of the Equitable Pay-
ments for Watershed Services (EPWS) in Tanzania reported income
increases for ES providers, while an early non-counterfactual study
(Lopa et al., 2012), reported that participants in the program increased
3.5 fold within the ﬁrst year probably because of the ﬁnancial in-
centives.
According to non-counterfactual studies, three PES schemes led to
income losses for participants due to land-use restrictions (Rodríguez de
Francisco et al., 2013; Soriaga and Annawi, 2010) and wildlife-induced
damage to crops and livestock (Naidoo et al., 2011).
Four counterfactual studies reported positive impacts on household
expenditure per capita of ES providers, while one reported no change. A
non-counterfactual study (Ibarra et al., 2011) found that households in
a Mexican community spent a larger share of their income on lower-
quality food because of lower local agricultural productivity due to
reduced agricultural area and shortened fallow cycles.
4.1.2. Employment
Seventeen studies, of which 12 were counterfactual, reported
changes in employment due to PES implementation. Seven counter-
factual studies and two non-counterfactual studies found that employ-
ment opportunities increased in ES provider communities. Two coun-
terfactual studies (Wang et al., 2017; Uchida et al., 2009) reported
increased employment opportunities for non-participants. Conversely,
Jack and Cardona-Santos (2017) found that households randomly as-
signed to PES contracts had higher labor constraints for casual oﬀ-farm
labor than those who auctioned for the contract, suggesting that the
contract would have been more beneﬁcial to self-selected households.
In Mexico, labor costs of PES-induced land management changes were
large compared to PSAH payments (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014).
Yin et al. (2014) reported declining on-farm employment but in-
creasing oﬀ-farm employment for participants of the SLCP compared
with non-participants, while a non-counterfactual study (Trac et al.,
2013) reported a shift to illegal timber harvesting. According to Uchida
et al. (2009), the largest impact of the SLCP was increased oﬀ-farm
employment of younger households or those with liquidity constrained
prior to the program.
A counterfactual (Miranda et al., 2003) and a non-counterfactual
study (Locatelli et al., 2008) reported increased employment related to
product transportation and transformation and additional temporary
labor due to the PSA in Costa Rica. Similarly, according to a non-
counterfactual study, the NFCP in China resulted in a transfer of labor
to other sectors and a shift from logging to forest management and
plantation farming (Liu et al., 2008).
4.1.3. Agricultural Production
Twelve studies, of which seven were counterfactual, reported im-
pacts on agricultural production. Positive impacts reported by coun-
terfactual studies included higher crop harvests or yields (Clements and
Milner-Gulland, 2015; Kwayu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017;
Beauchamp et al., 2018), bigger cattle herds (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014),
and slight increases in commercial crops (Jindal, 2010). Non-counter-
factual studies found increased grain productivity for households in
SLCP communities (Cao, 2011; Liu et al., 2008) and increased invest-
ments in agricultural production for Socio Bosque participants (Bremer
et al., 2014). Negative impacts in terms of reduced crop yields for
participants were reported in a counterfactual study by Hegde and Bull
(2011), and by two non-counterfactual studies in terms of reduced
agricultural or livestock production (Molina-Murillo et al., 2014;
Bremer et al., 2014).
4.1.4. Physical Capital
According to counterfactual studies, PES payments contributed to
the construction of a school and clinic (Jindal, 2010), a nursery
(Leimona et al., 2010), and forest road improvements (Wang et al.,
2017). Non-counterfactual studies reported that PES implementation
led to investments in local power grids (Yang et al., 2013), road pro-
tection from erosion (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010), greenhouses
(Corbera, 2010), and community infrastructure (Molina-Murillo et al.,
2014). However, according to Cao (2011) and Liu et al. (2008) (both
non-counterfactual), decreased tax revenues due to logging restrictions
reduced local government investment in China.
4.1.5. Poverty
Five counterfactual studies reported improvements in poverty in-
dices for participants. The Costa Rica PSA reduced poverty among
households in high-slope areas with low opportunity costs and low
deforestation threat (Robalino et al., 2014), but increased poverty in
low-slope areas with higher opportunity costs. The PSAH in Mexico
generated signiﬁcant but small poverty increases (Sims and Alix-Garcia,
2017) in areas where larger shares of the population participated in the
program, and for longer periods (Alix-Garcia et al., 2015). The eco-
nomic status (basic necessities) of ES providers in Cambodia improved
compared to non-participants (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015;
Beauchamp et al., 2018).
Three additional counterfactual studies analyzed poverty, but found
no signiﬁcant impacts (Arriagada et al., 2015; Diswandi, 2017;
Arriagada et al., 2018).
4.1.6. Land Tenure
Two counterfactual studies reported increased security against
squatters (Miranda et al., 2003) and redistribution of forestlands with
long-term secure tenure (Wang et al., 2017). Non-counterfactual studies
reported increased land tenure security for participants by creating
communal wildlife conservancies (Naidoo et al., 2011), tenure reg-
ularization (Porras et al., 2013), and perceived higher land security
(Bremer et al., 2014).
4.1.7. Social Capital
Twelve studies, of which four were counterfactuals (i.e. Leimona
et al., 2010; Miranda et al., 2003; Kwayu et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2017), reported mixed results in terms of changes in social capital. PES
schemes helped to build a connection with local governments and es-
tablish agricultural cooperative organizations in China (Wang et al.,
2017), while increasing trust and cohesion among participants in
Tanzania (Kwayu et al., 2017). The Costa Rica PSA increased voluntary
agreements, institutional dialogue, and coordination (Miranda et al.,
2003), as well as inclusion of marginalized actors according to a non-
counterfactual study (Porras et al., 2013). Leimona et al. (2010) found
that interactions between participants of a PES in Indonesia and ex-
ternal stakeholders increased, but created an exclusive group vis-à-vis
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non-participants.
Non-counterfactual studies reported both positive and negative
impacts on social capital. Bartels et al. (2010) found that Proambiente
participants in Brazil inﬂuenced state projects through strengthened
networks. The Pimampiro PES in Ecuador reinforced unequal power
relations within communities and between service users and providers
(Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013). Corbera (2010) found that the
establishment of forest management groups in Mexico translated into
community commitment to control damaging activities in forest areas,
but created conﬂict between formal and informal rights holders.
Locatelli et al. (2008) and Molina-Murillo et al. (2014) found that the
Costa Rica PSA improved governance and increased local institutional
support. Bremer et al. (2014) reported perceived improvements in
community organization but potential conﬂicts over access to reserved
land and Socio Bosque investment plans.
4.1.8. Human Capital
Out of eleven studies reporting human capital impacts, only one
counterfactual study found negative impacts (Jindal, 2010), in terms of
increased workloads for women. Two counterfactual studies (Miranda
et al., 2003; Scullion et al., 2011) and a non-counterfactual study
(Corbera et al., 2009) reported increasing environmental awareness.
Other counterfactual studies reported increased knowledge and skills in
agriculture and forest management (Alix-Garcia et al., 2014; Kwayu
et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017).
4.1.9. Natural Capital and Flows
According to counterfactual studies, positive impacts of PES in
natural capital (as a livelihood dimension) included increased water
availability for ES users (Zheng et al., 2013), increased forest con-
servation linked to a conservation ethic (Scullion et al., 2011), and
improved knowledge and perception of environmental services
(Arriagada et al., 2018). Non-counterfactual studies reported improved
perception of the environment (Locatelli et al., 2008) and of the sus-
tainability of conservation eﬀorts (Bremer et al., 2014), but also lower
deforestation due to lower fuelwood use (Yang et al., 2013).
4.1.10. Food Security
Three counterfactual studies (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015;
Alix-Garcia et al., 2015; Kwayu et al., 2017) and two non-counter-
factual studies (Naidoo et al., 2011; Ibarra et al., 2011) measured the
eﬀects of PES on food security, focusing on food consumption. House-
holds participating in the Ibis Rice program were more food secure
(Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015) or had twice per person con-
sumption (Naidoo et al., 2011) than non-participants. Alix-Garcia et al.
(2015) reported increased food consumption for poor households.
Kwayu et al. (2017) found increased ability of participants to meet
household food needs. Conversely, Ibarra et al. (2011) found only ne-
gative impacts, as land-use restrictions and hunting prohibitions in-
creased market dependency.
4.1.11. Cultural Capital
Four non-counterfactual studies addressed culture-related impacts
and all reported negative eﬀects for provider communities. Forest-use
restrictions aﬀected local customs and identity (Yang et al., 2013) or
hindered traditional practices (Trac et al., 2013) in China. Bans on
hunting and agricultural land uses for ES providers altered traditional
resource management and food systems, leading to degraded nutrition
of indigenous communities in Mexico (Ibarra et al., 2011). Clearance
restrictions disrupted fallow and rotation cycles, thus neglecting tra-
ditional practices and community identities in Ecuador (Rodríguez de
Francisco et al., 2013).
4.1.12. Health
Only one study (non-counterfactual) discussed the health impacts of
PES schemes, reporting reduced water-related diseases for households
in provider communities (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010).
4.2. Beneﬁt Appropriation and Opportunity Costs
In four studies, poor and better-oﬀ households, smallholders, and
larger landowners participated and beneﬁted almost equally from PES
schemes (Cole, 2010; Martin et al., 2014; Naidoo et al., 2011; Yin et al.,
2014). Conversely, other studies found that some households had better
access to PES than others. These included male-headed and richer
households (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Liang et al., 2012), more food-se-
cure or better-oﬀ households (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015;
Beauchamp et al., 2018), or those with a certain land area (Farley et al.,
2011; Lopa et al., 2012; Miranda et al., 2003; Porras et al., 2013; Raes
et al., 2014). Non-fully voluntary participation was reported in China
(Li, 2009) and in Ecuador (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013).
Nineteen studies discussed the opportunity costs associated with
original land uses. For instance, SLCP payments were higher than the
opportunity costs of retired land (Liang et al., 2012), while the pay-
ments of the PSAH in Mexico were lower than alternative incomes
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2014; García-Amado et al., 2011; Scullion et al.,
2011). Martin et al. (2014) and Raes et al. (2014) reported cases in
which an undiﬀerentiated payment rate independent of individual op-
portunity costs was deemed the most equitable choice. Arriagada et al.
(2015) found that >50% of the participants in the Costa Rica PSA
mentioned that environmental protection rather than ﬁnancial gain
motivated them to enroll in the program.
5. Discussion
Despite the popularity of PES and the plethora of publications on
the subject, this systematic review of peer-reviewed and grey literature
of PES impacts found only 46 studies that assessed PES livelihood im-
pacts, out of 885 screened. Many PES schemes have reached im-
plementation maturity slowly, limiting evaluation opportunities.
Despite the limited number of publications found, they provide
nuanced evidence of the livelihood impacts of PES, and highlight PES
design and evaluation gaps and opportunities.
5.1. Design of Assessments
Diﬀerent methods sometimes yielded opposite or mixed results for
the same PES scheme. For instance, in qualitative methods, more in-
depth discussions with individual participants may yield more negative
impacts as participants have the opportunity to express their discomfort
about program participation or the eﬀects on livelihood dimensions,
such as social and cultural, seldom captured in quantitative assess-
ments. Another partial explanation is that assessments from the ecolo-
gical and economic literature more often use quantitative methods,
focusing less on the sociological and political processes aﬀected by PES,
more often captured in the social sciences. The low use of mixed
methods reduces the opportunity to understand how contextual factors,
power relations, and equity issues determine multiple PES impacts for
heterogeneous populations.
The choice to apply a counterfactual evaluation or not is also re-
levant. Evaluations based on counterfactual analysis aim to provide us
with a robust understanding of the impacts of an intervention on par-
ticipants compared with non-participants. This is true when the inter-
vention is relatively straightforward, such as PES schemes based purely
on cash-transfers (or only one modality of compensation) for a clearly
deﬁned and relatively homogeneous population. In the counterfactual
studies reviewed, the quality of sample selection was not always clear,
hindering judgment on group comparability. We found mixed results
for income eﬀects assessed with counterfactual and non-counterfactual
methods for the same PES cases (e.g. in China and Mexico). Measuring
income increases requires proper counterfactuals to determine the ex-
tent of income change actually attributable to PES and if this change is
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signiﬁcant compared to non-participants. At the same time, quantita-
tive methods should be complemented by qualitative methods to un-
derstand contextual factors and processes that aﬀect those changes. For
instance, in Costa Rica, non-counterfactual methods were useful to
understand why larger landholders beneﬁt more from PES than small-
holders (e.g. Locatelli et al., 2008). For some aspects, non-counter-
factual methods that reconstruct baseline information and ask PES
participants how the initial situation has changed after PES im-
plementation can be useful to evaluate variations in dimensions such as
infrastructure and land tenure security, if these were beneﬁts clearly
agreed during PES negotiation. In these cases, the causality between
PES intervention and outcome is more straightforward as it is directly
dependent on PES implementation and achievement of the respective
commitments.
5.2. Who Beneﬁts and How?
Our review showed that PES assessments focus on ES providers and
on ﬁnancial impacts. Only one study evaluated the eﬀects on ES users.
Few reported eﬀects on non-participants, who experienced higher in-
come inequality or lower income than PES participants, or communities
suﬀering from reduced public investment or employment. The pre-
vailing focus on ES providers thwarts the understanding of broader
societal impacts, including on communities, non-participants, institu-
tions, and ES buyers. In terms of “losers”, they were often ES providers
experiencing income decreases due to PES-induced restrictions.
However, the consequences of PES schemes cannot be fully captured in
terms of income as its translation into enhanced livelihoods is not linear
(Pascual et al., 2010).
This relates to another key aspect to understand how ES providers
beneﬁt from PES: in theory, if payments oﬀset or exceed opportunity
costs of conserving or better managing ES-providing areas, then PES
could help to alleviate economic poverty. However, only half of the
studies discussed opportunity costs, thus hampering our ability to dis-
cern the net income eﬀects of PES (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015). Indeed,
ﬁnancial beneﬁts of PES are not always the main motivation of parti-
cipants. Participants enrolled in PES initiatives that were not necessa-
rily compensating the opportunity costs (Beauchamp et al., 2018;
Arriagada et al., 2015). Other non-economic reasons may explain en-
rollment such as conservation ethics, improvements in human and so-
cial assets, but also peer pressure or coercion (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005;
Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013).
Evidence of impacts in non-ﬁnancial capital is mixed and context-
dependent. For example, only a few studies reported increased land
tenure security, often considered an important livelihood impact of PES
(Lawlor et al., 2013). At the same time, our review yielded cases in
which access rules and land-use restrictions led to segregation between
powerful groups and less inﬂuential farmers, thus reducing community
cohesion. Signiﬁcantly, such results reﬂect inadequate identiﬁcation of
values inherent to ES, as the value system of a community might not
identify with standard opportunity cost assessments.
5.3. Current Gaps
The empirical basis of the livelihood impacts of PES, although in-
creasing, is still inadequate and seldom comparable, thus limiting the
capacity of science to conclude about PES impacts under diverse socio-
ecological systems.
In terms of PES design, we found key gaps for generating and as-
sessing PES livelihood impacts. Sound monitoring and evaluation sys-
tems are urgently needed (Ezzine-De-Blas et al., 2016; Hejnowicz et al.,
2014), and should aim to overcome the disconnect between short-term
payments and long-term agreements (Quintero and Pareja, 2015;
Tacconi et al., 2013).
Limitations in evaluation design hinder the assessment of overall
and disaggregated societal beneﬁts of PES. Sound evaluations that
complement qualitative and quantitative methods, applying rigorous
counterfactuals (e.g. Gertler et al., 2016) whenever appropriate, and
disentangling disaggregated PES impacts on diﬀerent types of ES pro-
viders, users, and non-participants are needed. Additionally, the iden-
tiﬁcation of local livelihood indicators can unearth contextual values
and priorities, allowing holistic and context-relevant PES design and
implementation (Blundo-Canto et al., 2016).
When counterfactual evaluation is not appropriate, fuzzy multi-
criteria analysis provides meaningful results, such as those provided by
Locatelli et al. (2008), although quantiﬁcation might be challenging.
Other approaches, such as process tracing, contribution analysis, or
developmental evaluation, that take into account complexity and sys-
temic change, can be applied (Bamberger et al., 2010; Hearn and
Buﬀardi, 2016; Patton, 2014).
It is also important to consider contextual evolutions over the long
term for counterfactual evaluation to be robust (Beauchamp et al.,
2018), acknowledging that socioeconomic characteristics usually
change slowly and incrementally (Arriagada et al., 2015). Analysis of
past trends and evolution of key variables in the contexts analyzed can
support the design of more appropriate and realistic evaluations.
Moreover, PES evaluations should consider the continuity, duration,
and stability of ﬁnancial incentives, which shape the sustainability of
economic improvements achieved through PES.
From the economic beneﬁts perspective, our review provided in-
sights into under-researched aspects: i) the impact of PES on changes in
household expenditure and choice and ii) the trade-oﬀ between in-
dividual household income and community inequality. Some studies
showed that PES were used to purchase low-quality food to substitute
food formerly produced in land set aside for conservation. This type of
eﬀect deserves more in-depth studies that take into account patterns of
change comparing participants and non-participants. For the second
aspect, some studies showed that while PES increase income for parti-
cipating households, they could exacerbate the income gap with non-
participants. This trade-oﬀ deserves greater attention for assessing
overall equity eﬀects of PES.
Better economic assessment of PES impacts should increase eﬀorts
on fuller accounting of opportunity costs (Pascual et al., 2010) and
understanding the rationale behind PES participation decisions, cou-
pling economic, environmental, and cultural considerations (Corbera
et al., 2007). These considerations are key when designing and nego-
tiating PES. When opportunity costs are low and more proﬁtable land-
use alternatives are lacking, enrollment is more likely even despite low
payment rates (Arriagada et al., 2009). In this respect, an opportunity
exists for agricultural research in testing alternatives that increase
productivity while reducing negative environmental externalities. This
may reduce the negative impacts associated with reduced agricultural
production reported in some of the reviewed studies. Additionally,
opportunity costs should be periodically re-assessed to adapt payments
to changing costs in time.
From a theoretical perspective, non-monetary and non-material li-
velihood aspects are understudied in PES evaluations. The few studies
that reported increased food security for ES providers consider only
food availability, a limited view of food security, which is multi-
dimensional (FAO, 2011). The bias towards food availability rather
than food quality, access, or stability reﬂects trends in ES research
(Cruz-Garcia et al., 2016).
Our review conﬁrms that there is little evidence of the social im-
pacts of PES (Hejnowicz et al., 2014). Cultural impacts are almost ig-
nored. The studies that analyzed these impacts provided a more com-
plex picture of individual and community-level changes generated by
PES. Additionally, half of the studies reviewed reported trade-oﬀs be-
tween impacts in diﬀerent livelihood dimensions, while ten reported
positive increases in multiple dimensions simultaneously.
Therefore, three research areas deserve particular attention: i) un-
derstanding the social and cultural impacts of PES, ii) assessing en-
vironmental and economic additionality from improving other ES at the
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expense of cultural ones, iii) and evaluating PES impacts in terms of
trade-oﬀs and synergies between multiple livelihood dimensions.
6. Conclusions
This systematic review provides empirical evidence of the livelihood
impacts of PES schemes and identiﬁes current gaps in their design and
evaluation. The studies reviewed presented more positive livelihood
impacts than negative ones, often focused on economic beneﬁts for ES
providers. Nonetheless, a third of the studies assessed multiple liveli-
hood dimensions, out of each half that reported trade-oﬀs between
dimensions.
Some studies found that diverse motivations beyond economic ra-
tionale can determine the decision to participate in PES. PES design and
implementation should carefully consider why and how people parti-
cipate, to ensure equity and sustainability. Additionally, a better un-
derstanding of social and cultural aspects is important for PES eﬃciency
and power-sensitive analysis (Van Hecken et al., 2015), by accounting
for their institutional aspects (Corbera et al., 2009), equity considera-
tions (Pascual et al., 2014), and non-material and non-economic ben-
eﬁts (Chan et al., 2012).
PES initiatives were originally designed as conservation incentives
generating environmental additionality under cost-eﬀective and eco-
nomically eﬃcient conditions (Wunder, 2015). In practice, they are
often implemented to attain pro-poor impacts, while environmental
objectives might be secondary (Rosa da Conceição et al., 2015). Cer-
tainly, poverty exacerbates environmental degradation and environ-
mental degradation exacerbates poverty (Duraiappah, 1998). There-
fore, environmental conservation and poverty alleviation initiatives
should aim to be synergistic. Along these lines, it is necessary to ensure
that PES schemes, while improving environmental service delivery, do
not worsen poverty in the places where they are implemented. This has
major policy implications, for instance, that could re-shape how in-
stitutions work in a way that promotes interdisciplinary interactions
between policymakers and decision makers to create regulations that
address both environmental degradation and poverty, involving new ES
buyers interested in societal impacts and ensuring eﬃcient use of public
funds. In terms of PES design, this would translate into better planning,
monitoring, and evaluation (Le Velly and Dutilly, 2016) that respond to
the objectives and inner logic of the intervention (e.g. purely environ-
mental, purely focused on poverty alleviation, seeking to maximize
both dimensions, and so on). Certainly, the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency
of PES are also a result of design choices (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder,
2015).
To integrate environmental with socioeconomic and equity objec-
tives, PES design should target disaggregated populations, looking for
synergies between environmental sustainability and livelihoods
(Raworth, 2012) and evaluating livelihood impacts adjusted by the
stability of PES agreements. Synergies and trade-oﬀs between, and
within, livelihood and environmental dimensions should be clear when
negotiating PES, enabling transparent mechanisms that distribute PES
beneﬁts equitably (Ingram et al., 2014). Assessment of power relations
between ES providers and users, but also within provider communities
(Tristán-Febres et al., 2018), would help avoid unequal beneﬁt appro-
priation. This is seldom considered in PES design and is a signiﬁcant
omission in ES research (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2016). Disaggregated
assessments that account for equity and distributional eﬀects, along
with environmental and livelihood co-beneﬁts and trade-oﬀs, as well as
understanding how local communities deﬁne their well-being to ensure
locally relevant outcomes are a priority for PES research, design, and
implementation that aim to achieve equitable and sustainable liveli-
hood improvement.
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3ie Payments for Environmental Services - 07/01/
2018
18 1
Payments for Ecosystem Services - 07/01/
2018
8 0
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2018
1 0
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3 0
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1 0
payment for ecosystem services - 07/01/
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OAIstera ti:"paymenta for environmental services" and impact - 07/01/
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50 6
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19 0
ti:"rewarda for environmental services" and impact - 07/01/
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0 0
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a The two studies were not found directly on OAIster but in a book found in the OAIster database.
b Results from the free search with the speciﬁed terms were screened only until page 25, as they become irrelevant to the topic approximately at page 20
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Appendix C. Main Characteristics of PES Schemes Reviewed in the Studies





Proambiente 1 Cash/In 
Kind
Government Farmers and forest 
landowners
Long term management plans
and certification
Cambodia 2
Ibis rice 2 Cash Government Communities in 
protected areas
Conservation of wildlife and
natural resources
Ecotourism 2 Cash Government Communities in 
protected areas
Conservation of wildlife and
natural resources
Bird Nest protection 
programme
2 Cash Government Communities in 
protected areas
Farming within agreed land-
use plans
China 13
Natural Forest Conservation 
Program (NFCP)
3 Cash Government Forest landowners Restore forest and vegetation
cover reducing logging
Paddy Land-to-Dry Land 
(PLDL)
1 Cash Government Communities in 
mountainous areas
Conversion of paddy land to
dryland




Government Farmers in sloping 
cropland
Restore forest and vegetation
cover reducing cropland
Changting County PES 1 Cash/In 
Kind
Government Farmers Development of orchards and
production forests on hilly
land or open forestland
Costa Rica 7
Costa Rica's Payment for 
Environmental Services 
(PSA)
6 Cash Government/ Private 
companies




1 Cash Government Farmers Agroforestry
Ecuador 4





Pinampiro PES 1 Cash Public water company Landowners Maintain vegetation cover,
not felling trees, allowing
natural regeneration
Socio Bosque/ Socio Páramo 3 Cash Government Landowners Conservation of land
Indonesia 2




West Lombok PES 1 Cash Private water company 
/ World Bank
Forest landowners Watershed protection
Kenya 1
Olare Orok Conservancy 
PES









FIDECOAGUA 1 Cash Government Landowners Forest protection
Mexico's Payments for 
Hydrological Services 
Program (PSAH)





avoid land use change
Malawi 1











Private company Individual farmers 
and communities









Conservation of wildlife and
natural resources
Philippines 1
No fire bonus scheme 1 In Kind Government Communities 
(barangays)
Fire prevention / suppression
(certificates)
Rwanda 1
University of East Anglia 
PES in Rwanda





Equitable Payments for 
Watershed Services (EPWS)
2 Cash Public water company 






*The ﬁrst row (in grey) indicates the number of publications for each country. The following rows indicate the PES schemes evaluated in each publication, per country. The values do not
sum up as several PES schemes were evaluated in multiple publications.
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Appendix D. Descriptive Analysis
D.1. Geographical Distribution
Most publications (n=36) are peer-reviewed articles, followed by book chapters (5), reports (1), one conference paper and a discussion paper.
Twenty assessments focus on PES schemes in Latin America Eight concerned the Mexican Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH)
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2015, 2014; Corbera et al., 2009; García-Amado et al., 2011; Ibarra et al., 2011; Scullion et al., 2011; Arriagada et al., 2018; Sims
and Alix-Garcia, 2017). Seven studies in Costa Rica, evaluated the national PES (PSA) (Locatelli et al., 2008; Miranda et al., 2003; Porras et al., 2013;
Robalino et al., 2014; Molina-Murillo et al., 2014; Arriagada et al., 2015), and one the Sistemas Agroforestales (SAF) (Cole, 2010). In Ecuador, three
studies evaluated the Socio Bosque PES scheme (Farley et al., 2011; Raes et al., 2014; Bremer et al., 2014), one the Comuna Zuleta PES (Farley et al.,
2011), and one the Pimampiro PES (Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013). One study in Brazil evaluated the Proambiente program (Bartels et al.,
2010). Thirteen publications evaluated PES schemes in China, of which nine concerned the Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) (Cao, 2011; Li
et al., 2011; Li, 2009; Uchida et al., 2009; Liang et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Trac et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013; Yin et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2013;
He and Sikor, 2015; Qu et al., 2017), three the Natural Forest Conservation Program (NFCP) (Cao, 2011; Liu et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2013), one the
Paddy Land-to-Dry Land (PLDL) program (Zheng et al., 2013), and one the Changting County PES (Wang et al., 2017). Two studies evaluated the
Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique (Hegde and Bull, 2011; Jindal, 2010), and two the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services
(EPWS) in Tanzania (Lopa et al., 2012; Kwayu et al., 2017). One study assessed a Tree planting scheme in Malawi (Jack and Cardona-Santos, 2017),
one the Olare Orok Conservancy PES in Kenya (Osano et al., 2013), one a PES led by University of East Anglia in Rwanda (Martin et al., 2014), and
one the Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) program in Namibia (Naidoo et al., 2011). Finally, two studies evaluated the
Bird Nest protection, Ibis Rice, Ecotourism programs in Cambodia (Clements and Milner-Gulland, 2015; Beauchamp et al., 2018), one the No ﬁre
bonus scheme in the Philippines (Soriaga and Annawi, 2010), and two the Cidanau Watershed PES (Leimona et al., 2010) and the West Lombok PES
(Diswandi, 2017) in Indonesia.
D.2. Buyers, Providers and Conditionality
Overall, the 46 studies evaluated 24 PES or PES-like schemes. We classiﬁed type of incentive according to the modality of payment: cash, cash
with in-kind, or purely in-kind. We did not include capacity-building activities as in-kind payments unless explicitly identiﬁed as a feature of the
agreement. In 17 out of these, the incentive mechanism were cash transfers, followed by a combination of cash and in-kind (6), or purely in-kind (1).
Speciﬁc in-kind compensation beyond cash payments included an annual in-kind subsidy of grain and free seedlings (SLCP); seedlings and
technical assistance (Nhambita Community Carbon Project); technical assistance and long-term land use plans (Proambiente); inputs and training
(Tree planting PES); green infrastructure (Changting Country PES); and timber tree planting (West Lombok PES). The “No-Fire Bonus scheme” in the
Philippines only provided in-kind compensation (infrastructure).
The main ES buyers included governments (15 PES), followed by private companies (4), public water companies (3), an international research
center and a university ES providers were most frequently individual households (16 PES), entire communities (5) or both (3).
Conditionality rules included conservation of wildlife (habitat protection, or relocation and exclusion of grazing) and natural resources (4),
restoration or maintenance of forest or vegetation cover (4 and 3), agroforestry (3) and land use change (3).
Providers were mostly individual households (13 PES), entire communities (6) or both (2).
Conditionality rules included conservation of wildlife and natural resources (4), restoration of forest or vegetation cover (4), agroforestry (3),
maintenance of vegetation cover (3), land use change (3), forest protection (2), long term management plans (2), watershed protection (1), ﬁre
prevention (1), and conservation of land (1). Wildlife conservation entailed habitat protection or relocation and exclusion of grazing. In one PES
scheme, conditionality was based on voluntary settlement relocation and livestock grazing exclusion inside a conservancy reserved to high-end
wildlife tourism generating the payments for grazers (Osano et al., 2013).
D.3. Environmental Services
Of the 24 PES schemes, ten focused on ES from managed forests, agro-forestry systems or forests in previous farmlands, which we categorized as
agro-forestry ecosystems. Eleven PES schemes incentivized conservation of broadly deﬁned natural forest ecosystems in areas threatened by human
activities. One PES focused on High Andean grasslands (páramo), one on drylands, and one on wildlife conservancies.
The 24 PES schemes targeted diﬀerent environmental services as shown in Fig. A. Hydrological services, including sediment retention by
preventing soil erosion, ﬂood mitigation, and water quality, predominate (14 PES). Eleven PES schemes aimed at improving biodiversity con-
servation, while nine targeted carbon sequestration. Three schemes explicitly addressed cultural services (in Namibia, in Kenya and in Costa Rica),
two provisioning services, one reduced landscape ﬂammability and one desertiﬁcation protection.
Thirteen PES schemes explicitly targeted environmental services bundles. For instance, the Costa Rica PSA included hydrological services, scenic
beauty, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity protection, while the PSAH in Mexico addressed hydrological services and carbon sequestration. The
SLPC targeted hydrological services, desertiﬁcation protection and biodiversity. Proambiente considered carbon sequestration, biodiversity, hy-
drological services, and landscape ﬂammability.
D.4. Measurement of Livelihood Impacts
The studies used diﬀerent methods to measure livelihoods impacts, including purely qualitative (15), purely quantitative (14) and mixed-
methods (14), of which 26 compared participants' to non-participants' impacts. Most often, data collection methods included surveys (29 studies),
interviews (18), document reviews (13), and focus groups (9). Seventeen counterfactual studies and two non-counterfactuals explicitly reported
sample selection methods. Counterfactual assessments usually applied quantitative or mixed methods (14 and 10 publications respectively). Mixed-
methods studies used qualitative data to deepen understanding of livelihood impacts measured through quantitative analysis. Martin et al. (2014),
for instance, carried out interviews with participant and non-participant households in Rwanda to explore negative eﬀects. Yang et al. (2013)
conducted interviews to understand better the planning, implementation, evaluation and decision-making processes. Among qualitative studies, two
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carried out in-depth interviews and focus groups with both participants and non-participants. Two non-counterfactuals mentioned ﬁeldwork ac-
tivities but provided no further speciﬁcation, while assignment to counterfactual was unclear in two studies.
Seven counterfactuals analyzed data from before and after PES implementation. For instance, Yin et al. (2014) adopted a trend study approach
spanning ten years; Clements and Milner-Gulland (2015) used mixed-eﬀects models on baseline data and repeated collections after 1 to 3 years of
payment disbursement.
D.5. Livelihood Dimensions and Indicators
Livelihood impacts were mainly analyzed through tests of diﬀerences (11 counterfactual, 3 non-counterfactual), descriptive statistics (5 coun-
terfactual, 7 non-counterfactual), description of data from document reviews (11 non-counterfactual), and multivariate regression analysis (8
counterfactuals).
In 78% of studies (18 counterfactual and 18 non-counterfactual analyses), impacts of PES were assessed in terms of the ﬁnancial livelihood
dimension. Financial capital and ﬂows included income (30 studies), income sources (10), income inequality (4), household expenditure (6), access
to credit (6), new investments (3), and land value (1). Other studies assessed changes in employment (12 counterfactual and 5 non-counterfactual),
or changes in agricultural production (8 counterfactual and 5 non-counterfactual), and physical capital (3 counterfactual and 6 non-counterfactual).
Indicators for changes in agricultural production included crop yields (8), crop production (5), and livestock production (2). Eight studies, all
counterfactuals, evaluated impacts in terms of poverty. Poverty indicators included a basic necessities index (2 studies), an asset index (2), a basic
food basket (1), a multidimensional poverty index (1), a poverty alleviation index (1), and a welfare indicator (1).
Few publications analyzed non-monetary and non-material indicators, including social (6 counterfactual and 9 non-counterfactual), human (7
counterfactual and 4 non-counterfactual) and natural capital (5 counterfactual and 4 non-counterfactual. Only non-counterfactual studies (4) as-
sessed PES impacts in terms of cultural capital. Two counterfactual studies assessed changes in perceived quality of
life.
Fig. A. Environmental services by type of ecosystem (n= 24).
Appendix E. Positive and Negative Impacts of PES Reviewed
The following table shows the number of positive and negative impacts of PES in the studies reviewed for each livelihood dimension, the method
used to analyze them, and who gains and who loses from positive and negative eﬀects.
The method column provides a classiﬁcation of the method according to the following abbreviations: Mix Count=mixed methods with
counterfactual; Mix No Count=mixed methods without counterfactual; Qual Count= qualitative methods with counterfactual; Qual No
Count= qualitative methods without counterfactual; Quant Count= quantitative methods with counterfactual; Quant No Count= quantitative
methods without counterfactual.
Due to limitations of synthesizing multiple data in one table, there is no direct relationship between numbers in the method column and the
columns who gains and who loses.
For clarity, we use abbreviations by type of stakeholders: P= providers; U=users; NP=non-participants.
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Dimension Positive impact n Method n Who gains n Negative impact n Method n Who loses n
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Appendix F. Indicators, Methods and Results in Terms of Impacts on Household Income in the Studies Reviewed




Counterfactual Proportion of income from the PES
scheme






























No Ranging from not critical amount to 47%
of income for one participant
100% of communities; 80% of
smallholders; 96% of larger landowners
reported positive impacts on ﬁnancial
capital, through increased (or more
stable) income from incentive
payments, or through potential long-
term income beneﬁts from productive
activities For smaller landholder
individual participants the payments







No The payment cannot replace the income
lost by workers when their former






Yes 78% of participants report income
increase
Average income of participants: US$
16,167 (10244)








No Ranging between 25%–50% of income US$ per household per year vary
between 33 and 508 depending on the
community











No Amounting to <8% of the average income
in 2010 compared to 27% in 2001
The payments contributed to the
increase in local incomes in one site, but






Matching Yes Participation increases income by
266600MTS (10US$) to 323000MTS











Yes Random allocation of aﬀorestation
contracts did not appear to aﬀect
measures of household socioeconomic
outcomes
Average eﬀect on total income from
crop sales when contracts were
auctioned: 86083* (48264)








Yes The average annual cash income for
households with both agroforestry
contracts and employment in
enterprises was much higher than either
non-participating households or
households that hold only agroforestry
contracts
Annual mean income of non-
participants: 12004 (142575)
Participants only in payments: 143540
(195010)







Matching Yes Payments contributed 20% of program










Yes The annual PES income of contributed
only around 3% to PES participants'
household incomes Only one group
regarded PES as a primary source of
income
Some participants mention that









Yes Positive impact upon household income,
but the impact decreases from
households at low income levels to
those at high income levels
Participation increases income by








Yes Notwithstanding signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects on household local wage income,
participating in the program has
negative eﬀects on on-farm
income, as well as migrating income
Coeﬃcient for impact of participation
on total income is −1895,1 for









No Total income increased because of
income from other sources such as
tourism Forestry workers dependent on
income from timber harvesting suﬀered
big economic losses This loss pushed
some local forestry workers below the
poverty line
Local government income decreased









No Indicator impacts on short-term income
was signiﬁcantly negative in the whole
sample and diﬀered between upper class






(null) and working class (very negative)
Indicator impact on medium and long-
term income diﬀered between upper
class (very positive) and three other
groups: small farmers (very negative),











No Farmers participating in the scheme
have used the additional money to
purchase clothes, assets, livestock, and
to pay school fees Baseline income
levels in the project area were too low to
make these investments In July 2009
144 farmers had joined the scheme and
were paid in May 2010 the equivalent of
a total of USD 1639 as an annual
payment to compensate for their eﬀorts
to improve land management, reduce
erosion and improve water quality By
May 2010 554 local farmers had
become sellers in the scheme, increasing
to 650 by November 2010 In July 2011,
participating farmers were paid a total
of USD 11,000 for their eﬀorts to
improve land As new people are still
joining the scheme the expected








Yes The proportion of PES of average income
for the two landowners who declared that
PES represents their main activity is 37%
For those who declared that PES is their
second source of income the proportion is
on average 12% Finally, for those who
ranked PES as their third economic
activity the average proportion is 18% It
is worth noting that the program does not
have a signiﬁcant economic eﬀect on









Yes Mean gross income in 2009 in KES for









No The US$340 million distributed
between 1997 and 2012 is probably the
PES's greatest direct socio-economic
beneﬁt The direct impact is highest in
remote rural areas, where PES is one of









No The majority of the experts stated that
farmers received a higher income due to
the compensation given by the
government and other reasons This was
diﬀerent from other existing studies,
which found that the subsidies were a








Yes Ranging from <10% to >70% for one of
the participants
The total proﬁt generated through
participation in for the seven
households in the study area is US$













No Payments range from US$15 to US$841
per year, with an average of US$252
Almost all participants in the scheme
indicated that payments were too low
Based on four interviews, the income
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from working their land would be much








Yes Of the 14 PES participants interviewed,
representing 40% of the landowners paid
by the PES scheme, all claimed the PES









No The scheme increased the ﬁnancial capital
of two villages, those with the lowest
annual budgets, for 1998 by 24% and
19%, respectively In contrast, villages
with the highest budgets, obtained a
relatively lower proportional increase in








No Household income was maintained or
increased in one study site, decreased in
another, while the change was







Yes Net income is 5,59 times higher for







No 89% of interviewed households
reported that the payments had brought









Yes On average, a household there received an
annual subsidy of up to 1929 yuan in
2006, accounting for 235% of its total
income in that year In Sichuan subsidy
was 767 yuan in 2006, equivalent to 9%
of the total household income in that year
250% increase in total income The
contributions of payment to farm, oﬀ-
farm, and total income are all
signiﬁcantly positive, leading to a










Yes Participant households' agricultural
income decreased by around 2000 yuan
relative to non-participant, presumably
from converting productive rice paddies
to less lucrative cornﬁelds The decrease
in agricultural income seems to be oﬀset
by an increase in migrant earnings
relative to non-participants of >3000
yuan on average




Alix-Garcia, J., Aronson, G., Radeloﬀ, V., Ramirez-Reyes, C., Shapiro, E., Sims, K., Yañez-
Pagans, P., 2014. Impacts of Mexico's payments for ecosystem services programme.
In: 3ie Impact Evaluation Report 20. India, New Delhi.
Alix-Garcia, J., Sims, K.R.E., Yañez-Pagans, P., 2015. Only one tree from each seed?
Environmental eﬀectiveness and poverty alleviation in Mexico's Payments for
Ecosystem Services Program. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Pol. 7, 1–40.
Arriagada, R.A., Sills, E.O., Pattanayak, S.K., Ferraro, P.J., 2009. Combining qualitative
and quantitative methods to evaluate participation in Costa Rica's program of pay-
ments for environmental services. J. Sustain. For. 28, 343–367.
Arriagada, R.A., Sills, E.O., Ferraro, P.J., Pattanayak, S.K., 2015. Do payments pay oﬀ?
Evidence from participation in Costa Rica's PES program. PLoS One 10, e0131544.
Arriagada, R., Villaseñor, A., Rubiano, E., Cotacachi, D., Morrison, J., 2018. Analysing the
impacts of PES programmes beyond economic rationale: perceptions of ecosystem
services provision associated to the Mexican case. Ecosyst. Serv. 29, 116–127.
Bamberger, M., Rao, V., Woolcock, M., 2010. Using mixed methods in monitoring and
evaluation: experiences from international development. In: SAGE Handbook of
Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research. Thousand Oaks, CA.
Bartels, W.-L., Schmink, M., Borges, E.A., Pereira Duarte, A., Arcos, H.D.S.S., 2010.
Diversifying livelihood systems, strengthening social networks and rewarding en-
vironmental stewardship among small-scale producers in the Brazilian Amazon:
lessons from Proambiente: livelihoods in the REDD? In: Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S.,
Suich, H. (Eds.), Payments for Environmental Services, Forest Conservation and
Climate Change. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 82–105.
Beauchamp, E., Clements, T., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2018. Assessing medium-term impacts
of conservation interventions on local livelihoods in Northern Cambodia. World Dev.
101, 202–218.
Berbés-Blázquez, M., González, J.A., Pascual, U., 2016. Towards an ecosystem services
approach that addresses social power relations. Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain. 19,
134–143.
Blundo-Canto, G., Cruz-Garcia, G.S., Tristán-Febres, M.C., Pareja, P., Quintero, M., 2016.
Many ecosystem services and few employment and marketing opportunities: the
paradox of an Andean community in Peru. In: CGIAR Research Program on Water,
Land and Ecosystems (WLE). Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Börner, J., Baylis, K., Corbera, E., Ezzine-de-Blas, D., Honey-Rosés, J., Persson, U.M.,
Wunder, S., 2017. The eﬀectiveness of payments for environmental services. World
Dev. 96, 359–374.
Bremer, L.L., Farley, K.A., Lopez-Carr, D., Romero, J., 2014. Conservation and livelihood
outcomes of payment for ecosystem services in the Ecuadorian Andes: what is the
potential for ‘win–win’? Ecosyst. Serv. 8, 148–165.
Bulte, E.H., Lipper, L., Stringer, R., Zilberman, D., 2008. Payments for ecosystem services
and poverty reduction: concepts, issues, and empirical perspectives. Environ. Dev.
Econ. 13, 245–254.
Calvet-Mir, L., Corbera, E., Martin, A., Fisher, J., Gross-Camp, N., 2015. Payments for
ecosystem services in the tropics: a closer look at eﬀectiveness and equity. Curr. Opin.
Environ. Sustain. 14, 150–162.
Cao, S., 2011. Impact of China's large-scale ecological restoration program on the en-
vironment and society in arid and semiarid areas of China: achievements, problems,
synthesis, and applications. Crit. Rev. Environ. Sci. Technol. 41, 317–335.
Chambers, R., Conway, G., 1992. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for
G. Blundo-Canto et al. Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160–183
181
the 21st Century. IDS Discussion Paper No. 296. Institute of Development Studies,
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
Chan, K.M.A., Guerry, A.D., Balvanera, P., Klain, S., Satterﬁeld, T., Basurto, X., Bostrom,
A., Chuenpagdee, R., Gould, R., Halpern, B.S., Hannahs, N., 2012. Where are cultural
and social in ecosystem services? A framework for constructive engagement.
Bioscience 62, 744–756.
Clements, T., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2015. Impact of payments for environmental services
and protected areas on local livelihoods and forest conservation in northern
Cambodia. Conserv. Biol. 29, 78–87.
Cole, R.J., 2010. Social and environmental impacts of payments for environmental ser-
vices for agroforestry on small-scale farms in southern Costa Rica. Int J Sust Dev
World 17, 208–216.
Corbera, E., 2010. Mexico’s PES-carbon programme: A preliminary assessment and im-
pacts on rural livelihoods. In: Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H. (Eds.), Payments for
Environmental Services, forest conservation and climate change. Edward Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 54–81.
Corbera, E., Kosoy, N., Martínez Tuna, M., 2007. Equity implications of marketing eco-
system services in protected areas and rural communities: case studies from Meso-
America. Glob. Environ. Chang. 17, 365–380.
Corbera, E., Soberanis, C.G., Brown, K., 2009. Institutional dimensions of payments for
ecosystem services: an analysis of Mexico's carbon forestry programme. Ecol. Econ.
68, 743–761.
Cruz-Garcia, G.S., Sachet, E., Vanegas, M., Piispanen, K., 2016. Are the major imperatives
of food security missing in ecosystem services research? Ecosyst. Serv. 19, 19–31.
Cruz-Garcia, G.S., Sachet, E., Blundo-Canto, G., Vanegas, M., Quintero, M., 2017. To what
extent have the links between ecosystem services and human well-being been re-
searched in Africa, Asia, and Latin America? Ecosyst. Serv. 25, 201–212.
Diswandi, D., 2017. A hybrid Coasean and Pigouvian approach to payment for ecosystem
services program in West Lombok: does it contribute to poverty alleviation? Ecosyst.
Serv. 23, 138–145.
Duraiappah, A.K., 1998. Poverty and environmental degradation: a review and analysis of
the nexus. World Dev. 26, 2169–2179.
Engel, S., Pagiola, S., Wunder, S., 2008. Designing payments for environmental services in
theory and practice: an overview of the issues. Ecol. Econ. 65, 663–674.
Ezzine-De-Blas, D., Wunder, S., Ruiz-Perez, M., Del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez, R., 2016.
Global patterns in the implementation of payments for environmental services. PLoS
One 11 (3), e0149847.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), 2011. Payments for
Ecosystem Services and Food Security. FAO, Rome, Italy.
Farley, K.A., Anderson, W.G., Bremer, L.L., Harden, C.P., 2011. Compensation for eco-
system services: an evaluation of eﬀorts to achieve conservation and development in
Ecuadorian páramo grasslands. Environ. Conserv. 38, 393–405.
García-Amado, L.R., Pérez, M.R., Escutia, F.R., García, S.B., Mejía, E.C., 2011. Eﬃciency
of payments for environmental services: equity and additionality in a case study from
a biosphere reserve in Chiapas, Mexico. Ecol. Econ. 70, 2361–2368.
Gertler, P.J., Martinez, S., Premand, P., Rawlings, L.B., Vermeersch, C.M.J., 2016. Impact
Evaluation in Practice, second ed. Inter-American Development Bank and World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Grieg-Gran, M., Porras, I., Wunder, S., 2005. How can market mechanisms for forest
environmental services help the poor? Preliminary lessons from Latin America. World
Dev. 33, 1511–1527.
He, J., Sikor, T., 2015. Notions of justice in payments for ecosystem services: insights
from China's sloping land conversion program in Yunnan Province. Land Use Policy
43, 207–216 (Feb 1).
Hearn, S., Buﬀardi, A.L., 2016. What Is Impact? A Methods Lab Publication. Overseas
Development Institute, London.
Hegde, R., Bull, G.Q., 2011. Performance of an agro-forestry based payments-for-en-
vironmental-services project in Mozambique: a household level analysis. Ecol. Econ.
71, 122–130.
Hejnowicz, A.P., Raﬀaelli, D.G., Rudd, M.A., White, P.C.L., 2014. Evaluating the out-
comes of payments for ecosystem services programmes using a capital asset frame-
work. Ecosyst. Serv. 9, 83–97.
Ibarra, J.T., Barreau, A., Campo, C.D., Camacho, C.I., Martin, G.J., McCandless, S., 2011.
When formal and market-based conservation mechanisms disrupt food sovereignty:
impacts of community conservation and payments for environmental services on an
indigenous community of Oaxaca, Mexico. Int. For. Rev. 13, 318–337.
Iftikhar, U.A., Kallesoe, M., Duraiappah, A., Sriskanthan, G., Poats, S.V., Swallow, B.,
2007. Exploring the inter-linkages among and between compensation and rewards for
ecosystem services (CRES) and human well-being. In: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper
No. 1. ICRAF Working Paper No. 36.
Ingram, J.C., Wilkie, D., Clements, T., McNab, R.B., Nelson, F., Baur, E.H., et al., 2014.
Evidence of payments for ecosystem services as a mechanism for supporting biodi-
versity conservation and rural livelihoods. Ecosyst. Serv. 7, 10–21.
Jack, B.K., Cardona-Santos, E., 2017. The leakage and livelihood impacts of PES con-
tracts: a targeting experiment in Malawi. Land Use Policy 63, 645–658.
Jindal, R., 2010. Livelihood impacts of payments for forest carbon services: ﬁeld evidence
from Mozambique. In: Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H. (Eds.), Payments for
Environmental Services, Forest Conservation and Climate Change. Edward Elgar
Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 185–211.
Kronenberg, J., Hubacek, K., 2013. Could payments for ecosystem services create an
“ecosystem service curse”? Ecol. Soc. 18 (1), 10.
Kwayu, E.J., Paavola, J., Sallu, S.M., 2017. The livelihood impacts of the equitable
payments for watershed services (EPWS) program in Morogoro, Tanzania. Environ.
Dev. Econ. 22, 328–349.
Landell-Mills, N., Porras, T.I., 2002. Silver Bullet or Fools' Gold? A Global Review of
Markets for Forest Environmental Services and Their impact on the Poor. Instruments
for Sustainable Private Sector Forestry Series International Institute for Environment
and Development, London, UK.
Lawlor, K., Madeira, E.M., Blockhus, J., Ganz, D.J., 2013. Community participation and
beneﬁts in REDD+: a review of initial outcomes and lessons. Forests 4, 296–318.
Le Velly, G., Dutilly, C., 2016. Evaluating payments for environmental services: metho-
dological challenges. PLoS One 11 (2), e0149374.
Leimona, B., Laxman, J., van Noordwijk, M., 2009. Can rewards for environmental ser-
vices beneﬁt the poor? Lessons from Asia. Int. J. Commons 3 (1), 82–107.
Leimona, B., Pasha, R., Rahadian, N.P., 2010. The livelihood impacts of incentive pay-
ments for watershed management in Cidanau Watershed, West Java, Indonesia. In:
Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H. (Eds.), Payments for Environmental Services,
Forest Conservation and Climate Change. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK,
pp. 106.
Li, Y., 2009. Social and ecological impact of PES program in arid region: the case from
Zhang-ye in northwest China. In: ICISE Proceedings of the First IEEE International
Conference Information Science Engineering, pp. 5113–5116.
Li, J., Feldman, M.W., Li, S., Daily, G.C., 2011. Rural household income and inequality
under the sloping land conversion program in western China. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.
S. A. 108, 7721–7726.
Liang, Y., Li, S., Feldman, M.W., Daily, G.C., 2012. Does household composition matter?
The impact of the Grain for Green Program on rural livelihoods in China. Ecol. Econ.
75, 152–160.
Liu, J., Li, S., Ouyang, Z., Tam, C., Chen, X., 2008. Ecological and socioeconomic eﬀects of
China's policies for ecosystem services. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 105,
9477–9482.
Locatelli, B., Rojas, V., Salinas, Z., 2008. Impacts of payments for environmental services
on local development in northern Costa Rica: a fuzzy multi-criteria analysis. Forest
Policy Econ. 10, 275–285.
Lopa, D., Mwanyoka, I., Jambiya, G., Massoud, T., Harrison, P., Ellis-Jones, M., Blomley,
T., Leimona, B., Van Noordwijk, M., Burgess, N.D., 2012. Towards operational pay-
ments for water ecosystem services in Tanzania: a case study from the Uluguru
Mountains. Oryx 46, 34–44.
Mahanty, S., Suich, H., Tacconi, L., 2013. Access and beneﬁts in payments for environ-
mental services and implications for REDD+: lessons from seven PES schemes. Land
Use Policy 31, 38–47.
Martin, A., Gross-Camp, N., Kebede, B., McGuire, S., 2014. Measuring eﬀectiveness, ef-
ﬁciency and equity in experimental payments for ecosystem services trial. Glob.
Environ. Chang. 28, 216–226.
Martin-Ortega, J., Ojea, E., Roux, C., 2012. Payments for Water Ecosystem Services in
Latin America: Evidence From Reported Experience. Working Paper Series. Basque
Centre for Climate Change (BC3), Bilbao, Spain.
Miranda, M., Porras, I.T., Moreno, M.L., 2003. The Social Impacts of Payments for
Environmental Services in Costa Rica. A Quantitative Field Survey and Analysis of the
Virilla Watershed. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED),
London.
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaﬀ, J., Altman, D.G., 2009. Preferred reporting items for
systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. Br. Med. J. 339,
b2535.
Molina-Murillo, S.A., Pérez Castillo, J.P., Herrera Ugalde, M.E., 2014. Assessment of
environmental payments on indigenous territories: the case of Cabecar-Talamanca,
Costa Rica. Ecosyst. Serv. 8, 35–43.
Muradian, R., Corbera, E., Pascual, U., Kosoy, N., May, P.H., 2010. Reconciling theory
and practice: an alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for
environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 69, 1202–1208.
Muradian, R., Arsel, M., Pellegrini, L., Adaman, F., Aguilar, B., Agarwal, B., Corbera, E.,
Ezzine de Blas, D., Farley, J., Froger, G., Garcia-Frapolli, E., Gómez-Baggethun, E.,
Gowdy, J., Kosoy, N., Le Coq, J.F., Leroy, P., May, P., Méral, P., Mibielli, P.,
Norgaard, R., Ozkaynak, B., Pascual, U., Pengue, W., Perez, M., Pesche, D., Pirard, R.,
Ramos-Martin, J., Rival, L., Saenz, F., Van Hecken, G., Vatn, A., Vira, B., Urama, K.,
2013. Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions.
Conserv. Lett. 6, 274–279.
Naidoo, R., Weaver, L.C., De Longcamp, M., Du Plessis, P., 2011. Namibia's community-
based natural resource management programme: an unrecognized payments for
ecosystem services scheme. Environ. Conserv. 38, 445–453.
Van Noordwijk, M., Leimona, B., Emerton, L., Tomich, T.P., Velarde, S.J., Kallesoe, M.,
Sekher, M., Swallow, B., 2007. Criteria and Indicators for Environmental Service
Compensation and Reward Mechanisms: Realistic, Voluntary, Conditional and Pro-
poor. CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 2. ICRAF Working Paper No. 37. Nairobi,
Kenya.
Osano, P.M., Said, M.Y., de Leeuw, J., Ndiwa, N., Kaelo, D., Schomers, S., Birner, R.,
Ogutu, J.O., 2013. Why keep lions instead of livestock? Assessing wildlife tourism-
based payment for ecosystem services involving herders in the Maasai Mara, Kenya.
Nat. Res. Forum 37, 242–256.
Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A., Platais, G., 2005. Can payments for environmental services help
reduce poverty? An exploration of the issues and the evidence to date from Latin
America. World Dev. 33, 237–253.
Pascual, U., Muradian, R., Rodríguez, L.C., Duraiappah, A., 2010. Exploring the links
between equity and eﬃciency in payments for environmental services: a conceptual
approach. Ecol. Econ. 69, 1237–1244.
Pascual, U., Phelps, J., Garmendia, E., Brown, K., Corbera, E., Martin, A., Gomez-
Baggethun, E., Muradian, R., 2014. Social equity matters in payments for ecosystem
services. Bioscience 64, 1027–1036.
Pattanayak, S.K., Wunder, S., Ferraro, P.J., 2010. Show me the money: do payments
supply environmental services in developing countries? Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy 4,
254–274.
Patton, M.Q., 2014. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 4th edn. Sage
G. Blundo-Canto et al. Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160–183
182
Publications, Chicago, IL, USA.
Pearce, D.W., Turner, R.K., 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, USA.
Porras, I., Barton, D.N., Miranda, M., Chacón-Cascante, A., 2013. Learning From 20 Years
of Payments for Ecosystem Services in Costa Rica. International Institute for
Environment and Development, London, UK.
Qu, M., Liu, G., Lin, Y., Driedger, E., Peter, Z., Xu, X., et al., 2017. Experts' perceptions of
the sloping land conversion program in the Loess Plateau, China. Land Use Policy 69,
204–210 (Dec 1).
Quintero, M., Pareja, P., 2015. Estado de avance y cuellos de botella de los mecanismos de
retribución por servicios ecosistémicos hidrológicos en Perú Centro Internacional de
Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), Cali, Colombia.
Raes, L., Aguirre, N., D'Haese, M., Van Huylenbroeck, G., 2014. Analysis of the cost-
eﬀectiveness for ecosystem service provision and rural income generation: a com-
parison of three diﬀerent programs in Southern Ecuador. Environ. Dev. Sustain. 16,
471–498.
Raworth, K., 2012. A safe and just space for humanity: can we live within the doughnut?
Nature 461, 1–26.
Robalino, J., Sandoval, C., Villalobos, L., Alpízar, F., 2014. Local Eﬀects of Payments for
Environmental Services on Poverty. Environment for Development (EfD) Discussion
Paper Series. Efd-DP-14-12.
Rodríguez de Francisco, J.C., Budds, J., Boelens, R., 2013. Payments for environmental
services and unequal resource control in Pimampiro, Ecuador. Soc. Nat. Resour. 26,
1217–1233.
Rosa da Conceição, H., Börner, J., Wunder, S., 2015. Why were upscaled incentive pro-
grams for forest conservation adopted? Comparing policy choices in Brazil, Ecuador,
and Peru. Ecosyst. Serv. 16, 243–252.
Samii, C., Lisiecki, M., Kulkarni, P., Paler, L., Chavis, L., 2014. Eﬀects of payment for
environmental services (PES) on deforestation and poverty in low and middle income
countries: a systematic review. Campbell Syst. Rev. 11.
Schomers, S., Matzdorf, B., 2013. Payments for ecosystem services: a review and com-
parison of developing and industrialized countries. Ecosyst. Serv. 6, 16–30.
Scullion, J., Thomas, C.W., Vogt, K.A., Pérez-Maqueo, O., Logsdon, M.G., 2011.
Evaluating the environmental impact of payments for ecosystem services in Coatepec
(Mexico) using remote sensing and on-site interviews. Environ. Conserv. 38,
426–434.
Sims, K.R.E., Alix-Garcia, J.M., 2017. Parks versus PES: evaluating direct and incentive-
based land conservation in Mexico. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 86, 8–28.
Sommerville, M.M., Jones, J.P.G., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2009. A revised conceptual fra-
mework for payments for environmental services. Ecol. Soc. 14, 34.
Soriaga, R., Annawi, D., 2010. The “No-Fire Bonus” scheme in Mountain province,
Cordillera administrative region, Philippines. In: Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H.
(Eds.), Payments for Environmental Services, Forest Conservation and Climate
Change. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 130–159.
Tacconi, L., 2012. Redeﬁning payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 73,
29–36.
Tacconi, L., Mahanty, S., Suich, H., 2013. The livelihood impacts of payments for en-
vironmental services and implications for REDD+. Soc. Nat. Resour. 26, 733–744.
Tallis, H., Kareiva, P., Marvier, M., Chang, A., 2008. An ecosystem services framework to
support both practical conservation and economic development. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U. S. A. 105, 9457–94564.
Trac, C.J., Schmidt, A.H., Harrell, S., Hinckley, T.M., 2013. Is the returning farmland to
Forest program a success? Three case studies from Sichuan. Environ. Pract. 15,
350–366.
Tristán-Febres, M.C., Blundo-Canto, G., Cruz-Garcia, G.S., Quintero, M., Pareja-Cabrejos,
P., 2018. Competing uses and access to hydrological resources in upstream peasant
communities of the Cañete River Watershed, Peru. In: Rivera, D., Godoy-Faundez, A.,
Lillo, M. (Eds.), Andean Hydrology. CRC Press, Boca Raton.
Uchida, E., Rozelle, S., Xu, J., 2009. Conservation payments, liquidity constraints, and oﬀ-
farm labor: impact of the grain-for-green program on rural households in China. Am.
J. Agric. Econ. 91, 70–86.
Van Hecken, G., Bastiaensen, J., Windey, C., 2015. Towards a power-sensitive and so-
cially-informed analysis of payments for ecosystem services (PES): addressing the
gaps in the current debate. Ecol. Econ. 120, 117–125.
Wang, C., Pang, W., Hong, J., 2017. Impact of a regional payment for ecosystem service
program on the livelihoods of diﬀerent rural households. J. Clean. Prod. 164,
1058–1067.
Wunder, S., 2008. Payments for environmental services and the poor: concepts and
preliminary evidence. Environ. Dev. Econ. 13, 279–297.
Wunder, S., 2013. When payments for environmental services will work for conservation.
Conserv. Lett. 6, 230–237.
Wunder, S., 2015. Revisiting the concept of payments for environmental services. Ecol.
Econ. 117, 234–243.
Yang, W., Liu, W., Viña, A., Luo, J., He, G., Ouyang, Z., Zhang, H., Liu, J., 2013.
Performance and prospects of payments for ecosystem services programs: evidence
from China. J. Environ. Manag. 127, 86–95.
Yin, R., Liu, C., Zhao, M., Yao, S., Liu, H., 2014. The implementation and impacts of
China's largest payment for ecosystem services program as revealed by longitudinal
household data. Land Use Policy 40, 45–55.
Zheng, H., Robinson, B.E., Liang, Y.-C., Polasky, S., Ma, D.-C., Wang, F.-C., Ruckelshaus,
M., Ouyang, Z.-Y., Daily, G.C., 2013. Beneﬁts, costs, and livelihood implications of a
regional payment for ecosystem service program. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 110,
16681–16686.
G. Blundo-Canto et al. Ecological Economics 149 (2018) 160–183
183
